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American Power in Transition

The True Tragedy of American Power
Isaiah Wilson III
© 2013 Isaiah Wilson III

Abstract: American distaste for tragedy has led US strategists and
policymakers to mistake mere force for power. Understanding the
difference between force and power is vital to America’s rise as a
durable and balanced global power, and not merely as a forceful hegemon. This understanding is all the more imperative at a time of
compounding global security challenges and austerity.
What individuals do is related to what they think. . . . Since wars begin in the
minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must
be constructed.1

T

here is a fine line between a tragic hero’s flaw and his virtue.
The classic tragedies—those of Sophocles and Shakespeare, for
instance—present a noble protagonist, “better than we” to the
audience. His tragic flaw causes him to fall from prosperity to misery
through a series of reversals and discoveries. In a typical case, the hero’s
fall occurs in stages: Act I introduces the hero, against whom dark forces
align in Act II so by Act III it becomes clear to the audience (and sometimes to the hero) that his fate will be the opposite of what he hoped;
the catastrophe of Act IV exposes the limits of the hero’s power, and
Act V secures our recognition (in a moment of “catharsis”) of the larger
patterns at work in the play. What makes tragedy so poignant is not only
how it shows human beings as the playthings of fate, but how it reveals
that fate lurking in our own characters, so close to the qualities we cherish
as to be indistinguishable from them. The same pride and probity that
make Oedipus excel as king lead him to overestimate his strength and
self-sufficiency; the same profundity and eloquence that make Hamlet a
compelling individual make him a dilatory and ineffective agent. If these
heroes could see their virtues within their proper bounds, they would no
longer be the subjects—the victims—of tragedy. But they cannot and
so they are.
American stories tend to resemble not tragedies so much as classic
comedies, with happy endings and no loose ends. And yet a certain tragic
sensibility recently entered into our political discourse. We increasingly
sense the limits of not only our budgets, but our power to act as we
would like in the wider world. We sense ever more palpably the frustrations of power and feel ever more fleetingly the privileges it affords. Like
a tragic hero as the pivotal third act draws to a close, we feel ourselves at
once flawed and incapable of isolating our flaw in time to save ourselves.
One dimension of our tragic flaw is this taste for happy endings itself.
Among its myriad manifestations is the want of tragic sensibility in our
strategic culture, which persists even as our broader political discourse
becomes ever more somber. In this article, I show, first, how American
distaste for tragedy has led US strategists and policymakers to mistake
1     Francis Beer, Meanings of War and Peace (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 6.
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mere force for power. I want, then, to show how vital this differentiation
between “force” and “power” has been to America’s rise as a durable
and balanced global power, not merely a hegemon. It is important for
us to appreciate this distinction all the more as we rethink America’s
legitimate and possible roles as the leading power in the future. Finally,
I will suggest what an American grand strategy informed by a sense of
tragedy—as opposed to a tragic grand strategy—might look like.

Power and Force

Newton teaches us as much about the tragedy of power as Sophocles
or Shakespeare. As every graduate of Physics 101 knows, Newton defined
power with the following equation:

Newton could not account for power without force, but he did not
consider the two to be identical. In addition to force, one must account
for both time and displacement, the imaginary straight path from the
initial and final positions of a point, and the length and direction of which
one expresses in the “displacement vector.” All these variables stand in
harmonious symmetry in nature as reflected in Newton’s equation.
There are multiple definitions of power, but its essence is the capacity
to effect change and the ability to influence others.2 This is the foundation for Joseph Nye’s dissection of hard and soft power.3 Where power
was once based on geography, population, and raw materials, today the
basis lies increasingly on technology, education, and economic growth.
Hard power, which physically compels or directs other states to act in
a manner consistent with the goals of the state, typically appears in the
form of incentives or threats to alter what another state does.4 This hard
power assumes various forms: the size and capacity of the economic
marketplace, political influence, and military strength most notably. The
United States has used these forms of hard power to achieve its goals
since its birth, but just as important has been soft power. Soft power,
instead of inducement or coercion, co-opts and attracts; it shapes and
changes what other states want.5 Quite simply, soft power is getting
others to do what you want. It influences others because of attraction,
and the means of soft power are less tangible but no less potent: values,
culture, ideology, and institutions.
The United States has seen many of its policy objectives achieved
in part due to its soft power. American ideals stood in stark contrast to
those of Soviet communism and acted as a beacon for citizens trapped
behind the Iron Curtain. In considering hard and soft power, where
does the discussion of force begin?

2     Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004),
1-2.
3     Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books,
1990), 25-26.
4     Ibid., 31, 267.
5     Ibid., 267.
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Force, of which military power is only one element, is the most
blatant display of power.6 Power and force have a unique relationship
and are too easily conflated, contributing to errors in strategic judgment
and actions. While military force is an essential element of American
national power, it is neither the only essential element nor is it a sufficient proxy for American power. In terms of politics, power rests on a
state’s prestige and capacity to cause or prevent change, and it requires
legitimacy, which it derives from those who may be subject to it. True
power is self-legitimizing, purposeful, and strategic in securing national
interests. As such, power grows when others recognize the capacity,
latent or otherwise, a state possesses. Force, on the other hand, consists
of the tools that a state employs as an extension of its power, and when
employed without legitimacy and strategic purpose, may be very dangerous for the state that does so. Power is the foundation of force; but an
excessive employment of force—not just military, but economic and
political—can erode the power foundation. Paradoxically, the recognition of power comes from the display of force, but when states employ
force excessively, it may lead to a decrease in power. The unmistakable
link between power and force may, in fact, be found in national will and
legitimacy. The longer a state employs force, the greater the potential for
a decrease in national will, which may eventually result in the diminution of power.

Reconsidering American Power

For long stretches of US history, the basis of constitutional discussions centered on how to maximize liberty and prosperity, and how
to organize force with a view to preserving them. The goal was sufficient centralization of force to ensure citizen’s rights and no more than
the minimum necessary to protect and ensure liberty. It was only in a
Constitution so conceived that the unionist’s slogan, “join or die,” could
coexist with the revolutionary’s Don’t Tread on Me! By using principle to
restrain force, the ends of government to limit and define its means, the
founders understood, the nation could generate true power.
Where does American power stand today? From one vantage point,
US power seems unsurpassed. The United States is not only a memberstate of a global community of nation-states, but its leader. And the global
community—at least insofar as it is defined by global trade, humanitarian impulses, and other touchstones of American liberalism—is itself
the American regime writ large. In this sense, the United States is not
merely part of the system; it is the system. As a result, US domestic politics and policy determinations have widespread consequences beyond
American shores. Also as a result, American strategists feel a special
responsibility to guarantee the stability of the system as a whole.
Seen another way, however, American power not only checks but
undermines itself by appearing only in the guise of force. American
military force has had a mixed record of success, particularly over the
past decade in Afghanistan and Iraq. These and other irregular wars
and military-humanitarian operations (MHOs) the United States has
engaged in have demonstrated the inability of mere military force to
6     Hannah Arendt, “On Violence,” Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1972), 134.
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generate the conditions necessary to resolve conflicts: political agreement among internal factions, improved capacity in host nation civil
governance, and increased economic development. Force of arms can
bring down regimes with far greater ease than it can build them up.
Partly as a result of the prominence of force in the American disposition
toward the world, the persuasive and alluring aspects of America’s soft
power—its ability to attract other states through its ideals, ideas, and
culture—is also in question. And with good reason, as the United States’
focus on force led it in many cases to compromise its own core ideals
with greater effectiveness than any enemy could have done.
This, then, is the heart of the tragic paradox we face: a system of
government that generates power by restraining force has produced a
nation commanding unparalleled force, and with it the tendency to place
force rather than power at the core of its international relations. As the
founders knew, military force is an essential element of American power.
But this power rests equally on its capacity to effect or prevent change
by means of its prestige and legitimacy, which have as much to do with
the opinion of those subject to American power as with the opinions of
Americans themselves. True power is legitimate, purposeful, and strategic in securing national interests. The nation founded on such a notion
of power, yet bewitched with its own force resembles nothing so much
as the tragic hero tilting toward his drama’s climax.
The United States’ successful efforts to open markets are partially
responsible for its tenuous economic situation, and may potentially lead
to political backlash domestically.7 A worsening economic condition for
the United States may result in an inability to garner the necessary will
for further uses of economic force.8 The ongoing wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq have strained the United States politically and economically.9
Of late, the United States may have experienced a decline in its power
due to an excessive utilization of force and the greater use of force in
lieu of leveraging its latent power capacity. It has become imperative that
national decisionmakers, policymakers, and the American public alike,
begin to tackle directly and outright this complex and often paradoxical
interplay between American power and American force. 10

Legitimizing American Power

Legitimate power in the American tradition was originally conceived
as limited power, with an intentional emphasis on balance, durability,

7     Glenn Somerville and Chris Buckley, “China and US Each Claim Gains on Yuan Talks,” Reuters
News, May 25, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64M09Q20100525.
8     Bruce Bartlett, “How Deficit Hawks Could Derail the Economy,” Forbes, January 8, 2010,
http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/07/deficit-great-depression-recovery-opinions-columnistsbruce-bartlett.html.
9     The political effects of the United States’ actions have been the subject of several analyses,
including Andrew W. Terrill, Regional Spillover Effects of the Iraq War, Strategic Studies Institute, January
6, 2009; and Les Gelb, “Karzai Bests Obama, For Now,” Council on Foreign Relations (May 11, 2010);
Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2008).
10     The prominent use of its military, international democratization efforts, and uses of economic
statecraft in pursuit of national objectives are utilizations of force that may have affected the power/
force equilibrium of the United States.
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certainly energy . . . but importantly, also modesty.11 America’s approach
to power was originally an enterprise in the construction, constitution,
and assurance of a “minimalist state of power”—just enough centralization of power to ensure citizen’s rights and no more than that minimum
so as to protect and ensure liberty. The key political considerations in
connection with power were to be found not in physical force as an
end-all, but rather in the questions of justice and authority, i.e., what is
the moral and legal status of power? Looking back even further, in the
American tradition and to the nation’s grounding in Scottish Common
Sense philosophy, the view of power was/is that it is morally neutral—
not bad or good in and of itself—that its goodness or badness depends
more on how it is used, when, and for what purposes. In short, American
Power, traditionally and to remain consistent with who we are, who we
have been, and who we intend to continue to be in the future, as a republic, must always be purpose-driven, not ways-and-means determined.
Author, journalist, and political commentator, Leslie H. Gelb, offers a
useful contemporary commentary on the tenets of power, in his book,
Power Rules:12
•• “Power was never to be considered in soft or hard terms” This is actually more
a way of categorizing “force” not power. Power is not fungible and
divisible in that way. Power is, and was, essentially the capacity (“the
ability to . . . ”) to get people to do what they otherwise don’t want
to do, by pressure and coercion, using one’s resources and position.
Persuasion, values, and the use of force can and often do flow into
power, but at its core, power is psychological and political pressure.
•• “Power equals capacity.” Tracing the development of the word from its
ancient Greek and Latin origins, we find Power defined and understood to mean nothing more than “ability” as a noun and “to be able”
as a verb. Being a Power as a nation, much less a Great Power, is about
being able and in a position to compel others to your will; it is psychological and political action. In that respect, the description of Power
is synonymous to the Clausewitzian theoretical concept of war—an
act of policy (i.e., what governments choose to do and choose not to
do), and as such, a continuation of politics by other means. Power
is a grapple. It derives from establishing psychological and political
leverage or advantage by employing resources (i.e., wealth, military
capability, commodities, etc.), position (such as geographic regional
balancer or political protector), as well as maintaining resolve and
unity at home. Power, thus, varies with each and every relationship
and changes with each and every situation. It has to be developed and
shaped in almost each and every situation, and will vary over time
and place. Critically, the wielder of power must take great care to be
credible to be taken seriously, both at home and abroad.
•• “Having a ‘base of Power’ is much more than a simple adding up of resources.”
It depends on the kind and nature of those resources—namely, a
nation’s relative self-sufficiency and resilience once a power struggle
11     A full and comprehensive review of the Founding and Framing era literature is well beyond
the limits of this short article. However, a definitive and authoritative compendium source is found
in The Federalist Papers. Source for this article is Clinton Rossiter, comp., Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, (New York: Penguin Books, 1961).
12     Leslie H. Gelb, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2009).
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begins. For the American republic, the rightful and legitimate “base
of power” is not to be found in any particular process or institution,
and surely not in any political party; it should never be allowed to be
found in anything other than the people themselves—the General Will.
•• “Power shrinks when it is wielded poorly.” Failed or open-ended wars diminish power. Threats and unrealistic promises left unfulfilled diminish
power. Mistakes and continual changing of course can also diminish
power.
Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, it is important to appreciate
the Founders’ and Framers’ original intent for the source pool and main
sanctuary of American power—the law; and importantly, not a sanctuary found in rule by law, but rather in rule of law.
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, and now closing
on half-way into its second decade, military force has occupied a central
place in American foreign policy as the nation has confronted new
threats, opportunities, and responsibilities resulting from globalization and other geopolitical shifts in the international environment.
Questions about whether and how to intervene militarily have become
more important than ever.
Since the end of the Cold War, and certainly since the shock of 9/11,
the United States has found itself faced with a “Goldilocks” dilemma. It
had to find that “just-right,” or rather, that ethically just and legally right,
answer to the operational questions of the day—that is, how to project
and exercise military power in a manner that is effective, but just and
lawful. It is at the heart of this goldilocks challenge where questions of
American power versus force lie.
The post–Cold War period has proven to be a period of widespread
ethnic-religious, cultural conflict that neither states nor nonstate actors
have been able to contain. Since 9/11, the international community has
had to confront the rise of transnational terrorists. It has also been challenged to accommodate developing norms and obligations related to
such things as human security, self-determination, and human rights.
US military interventions since 1989 have fostered tectonic changes
in the international system. They have challenged traditional norms,
principles, rules, and decisionmaking procedures that have provided stability to the system for the past sixty years. In particular, US interventions
have challenged what was once considered largely inviolable—territorial
sovereignty.
While the 1990s witnessed the beginnings of a decline in interstate wars, there has been a rise in internal conflicts, and, importantly,
an increase in the internationalization of these internal conflicts. In
fact, the defining feature of many of the military interventions of the
1990s—Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, and
others—has been the rising call and drive for foreign interventions
aimed against sovereign states on behalf of citizens and communities
within those states.
Thus, the inviolability of state territorial sovereignty has unraveled,
in part through a combination of changes in the international security
system, but also at the hands of interveners among whom the United
States has been and continues to be a lead participant.
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Figure. The Paradox of American Power

Indeed, it has become apparent that the United States has had a
profound effect on the destabilization of the international system and
that it has challenged the traditional legal and normative international
regimes that have defined the obligations—and limits—of right and
just intervention, and the limited and precision uses of force as one (but
not the only) application of American power, for a half century. The
power dilemma facing the United States and the international community today is one of a goldilocks story line—it involves reconciling
these new justifications for intervention with the traditional norms that
focused on checking territorial aggressions by asserting near-absolute
state sovereignty.
In an earlier age, “island nations” like Great Britain (and to a lesser
degree, the United States) could build-down, even decimate, their
peacetime armies with impunity, as intervention was typically limited
to redressing violations of a sovereign state’s territory by an aggressor and a restoration of status quo ante-bellum. But since the 1990s, the
global security environment demands more from its great powers and
especially its leading state. Today’s interventions, to be considered right
and just, must establish a better state of peace post-bellum.13 The prevailing norm of universal human rights, once confined to the Hague and
Geneva Conventions, increasingly assumes the more demanding form
of a Responsibility to Protect capable of triggering (or at least justifying)
uses of military force for humanitarian purposes by an ever-growing
13     Jus post bellum (“justice after war”) obligations are on the rise, and have been for the past two
decades as evidenced by the emergence of new, albeit still uncodified conventions obligating foreign
intervention forces to not only wage just interventions, justly, but also to stay the intervention “beyond the warfight” as occupier on behalf of assisting in the establishment of a new social-political
governance—regime rebuilding. See Rear Admiral Louis V. Iasiello, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy, “JUS
POST BELLUM: The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 3/4
(Summer/Autumn 2004): 33-52, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/022caef3-60c8-4caa-9153bd08f28387d5/Jus-Post-Bellum--The-Moral-Responsibilities-of-Vic.aspx
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number of nation-states. The internationalization of internal conflicts,
oftentimes pitting one or more nation-states against roguish regimes
making national claims of self-determination, adds yet another illdefined but common causus belli.14 A sustainable security strategy in this
day and age must be based on a provision of force and a doctrine for
guiding its application capable of attaining “viable peace.”15 A sustainable security posture depends on marrying the right capabilities with
the right strategic goals (balance) and a capacity for mobilizing and
sustaining force that can achieve economies of scale in international
interventions (durability). The ability to marry so-called hard and soft
power in effective-cost and legitimate ways is the supreme test of security strategy making.
This has not, however, been the United States’ favored mode of
intervention. Instead, the history of American intervention reveals an
inclination to using martial instruments to cure what are, essentially,
political dilemmas. The flexibility and projectability of the US military
instrument has secured its prominence in the minds of American strategists, and yet the American record in unconventional interventions
(“dirty little wars”) has actually been quite dismal. This is especially so
when the United States has found itself an external patron to the counterinsurgent in intrastate wars and military-humanitarian interventions.
Many of the United States’ experiences in these types of interventions
have ended in stalemates or incomplete finishes.16 The Vietnam War
was a complete war-loss for the United States; it is perhaps too early to
tell how Afghanistan and Iraq will be remembered, but the trends do
not give much reason to hope these interventions will free the United
States from its historical trend. These interventions began well enough,
but like a boxer replete with years of bout experience and a reach that
outdistances younger, less-experienced competitors, the United States is
left facing this tale of the tape: “great reach, but poor endurance in the
latter rounds.”
Part of the problem is simply not having enough physical capacity
to meet global requirements, but this problem is not easy to address. If
ours is a “not enough boots on the ground” problem, then one simple
answer might be to limit the ground on which we send our available
boots. We might at the very least resolve not to occupy more ground, as
then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it when he said that “any
future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big
American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should
14     Isaiah Wilson III, “Dueling Regimes: The Means-Ends Dilemma of Multilateral Intervention
Policy,” World Affairs, January 2001.
15     A definition of “sustainable security” commensurate to the conditions of the 21st century
operating environment expands beyond traditional physical and material-based concepts of security,
i.e., beyond those forms of security typically achievable and sustainable by military power alone.
Today’s wider concept of “security” and the threats to it include, but are not limited to, issues
of human security (and the provision of basic essential needs), cultural security, economic security, and environmental security. For a full description, see “Promoting Sustainable Security,” NDC
Occasional Paper No. 12, NATO Defense College, Research Branch, Rome, February 2006, and
also the research by the Fund for Peace. For a definition of “viable peace,” see Jock Covey, Michael J.
Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies
for Conflict Transformation (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005),
16     Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining

Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63 (Winter 2009):
67-106.
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‘have his head examined.’”17 We might also get rid of ground currently
occupied.
Neither option, however, is feasible in today’s environment. The
ground and the threats on it, after all, “get a vote,” and they sometimes
demand an American presence even when Americans would prefer to
be elsewhere. While we might wish to withdraw from some of the nearly
130 countries where we perform a variety of intervention tasks ranging
from traditional combat to peace operations, to do so would likely destabilize the world even more than our occasional missteps do.18
Alternatively, the United States might acquire more boots. We have
long known the number of troops necessary for waging and winning
unconventional interventions. To defeat the violence of an insurgency,
a precondition for stabilization and reconstruction operations, we know
that it takes approximately one rifleman for every twenty insurgents. For
stability and reconstruction, approximately fifty soldiers are needed for
every one person in the population. These forces would be a multicomposition force bringing a wide variety of skills and knowledge to this
side of the counterinsurgency campaign, ranging from skills in major
combat operations to city and regional planning expertise. Finally, we
should not discount perhaps the most important lesson of all regarding
war . . . while it is vitally essential to first determine the kind of war a
nation is embarking upon (the supreme Clausewitzian warning), sometimes particular kinds of wars may embark themselves on a nation-state,
or community of nation-states. Put more simply, sometimes war is less
a matter of strategic choice and more an unavoidable issue of moral
imperative.
Not having the appropriate quantities of force (simple overstretch)
is bad enough; attempts to stretch that ill-fitting set of capabilities over
and onto a problem set well beyond the traditional military uses of force
(compound overstretch) can foster the illiberal practices that make
American intervention seem an exercise in imperialism. There is, of
course, a point of diminishing return that all great power nation-states
(and empires) must come to face as they attempt to expand or merely to
maintain their global status.
“Nations project their military power according to their economic
resources and in defense of their broad economic interests,” Paul
Kennedy has argued. “But, the cost of projecting that military power is
more than even the largest economies can afford indefinitely, especially
when new technologies and new centers of production shift economic
power away from established Great Powers—hence the rise and fall of
nations.”19 The mechanism that seems to lead a nation-state from liberal
towards more imperial forms of intervention is military force itself, and
17     Tom Shanker, “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and Afghanistan,” The New York Times,
February 25, 2011.
18     On troop deployments, see GlobalSecurity.org, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
ops/global-deployments.htm. I have focused on the inadequacy of current military force posture
from a “landpower” (US Army) standpoint for two main reasons: (1) lack of space to discuss Total
Force shortfalls and (2) the nature of the 21st century security dilemma is namely a landpower and
littorals challenge—ours is an incapacity to sustain force on ground we need to hold to build viable
peace and stability for the duration of the intervention. This task is largely and predominantly a core
Army function, and consequently from a military standpoint, a landpower shortfall.
19     Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Press, 1989),
Introduction.
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particularly the manner in which it is used. For the Roman Empire, it
was the legions—the institution of last resort—that, in their efforts to
secure Rome and her empire by means of increasingly authoritarian uses
of coercive force, contributed to her decline. Great care must be taken to
ensure that the actions our own “legions” take in defense of liberalism
do not have the unintended effect of fostering illiberalism.
To turn to our technological preeminence for solutions to vexing
human problems of this sort is to confuse the fruit of our success with
the cause of it. We do not enjoy power because of our advanced technology; we enjoy advanced technology because of our power.
In summary, it is important, essential, that the United States now
reconsider its understandings of power and its uses of force for at least
two reasons. First, the United States must, as a nation, recognize that it is,
in and of itself, a system effect.20 For better or worse, or perhaps mixes of
both, and particularly since its “last great power standing” rise to global
hegemony in the wake of World War II, the choices the United States
makes in where and how it intervenes (including those choices of where
not to intervene) are not merely US choices, but choices that impact
the entire world-system.21 Having a deep and accurate understanding
of and appreciation for differences between force and power is critical to liberal, legitimate, and instrumentally effective global leadership;
mistaking uses of force, “forcefully,” for power is a recipe for accelerated
decline of America as a great power, with destabilizing consequences for
long-term global stability, security, and prosperity.
Secondly, more difficult but equally important, we must take account
of the implications of our own roles and responsibilities, of our policy
choices and actions, into our Power calculations. The United States has
had a heavy hand in infusing the current international system with much
of its current instability—this, in spite of the noble goals and intentions
behind those policy decisions and uses of force. The internationalization of otherwise internal conflicts, military-humanitarian operations,
counterinsurgency, democratization, and preventive war—all uses
of American military force that have had destabilizing effects on the
stability of state regimes, national ethno-sectarian balances, and stability of the international system in general. We as a nation and global
leading power must become a better study of the quality of peace that we
promise through our acts of wars, those of short and long duration. We
must calculate the power consequences of the peace we ring in through
uses of force.

Renewing American Grand Strategy

Confronting a punishing budget crisis, an exhausted military, reluctant allies, and a public whose appetite for global engagement is waning,
the United States faces an intertwined set of critical questions. Among
these questions, three stand out:
•• How will current political realities affect the range of strategic choices
20     Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1998).
21     Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the
European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
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available to policymakers?
•• How can the United States government make the best possible strategic choices?
•• What role will the existing tapestry of US relationships and regional
partnerships play?
All of these are political questions. When resources become scarce,
the politics surrounding budget decisions escalate. All of these are also
military questions. In the final hours of last-ditch discussions to avoid
the February 2013 sequester, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin
Dempsey summarized the military aspect of budget battles with bracing
clarity. “What do you want your military to do?” General Dempsey
asked in testimony to the House of Representatives. “If you want it to
be doing what it’s doing today, then we can’t give you another dollar. If
you want us to do something less than that, we’re all there with you and
we’ll figure it out.”22 All of these are, finally, questions of grand strategy;
they involve the calculated relation of means to large ends.23 On this
plane, the fundamental challenge facing the United States might be put
this way: After sixty-five years of pursuing a globally engaged grand
strategy—nearly a third of which transpired without a great peer power
rival—has the time finally come for retrenchment?24 Or can the United
States discover a way to navigate uncertainty while preserving American
dominance as a leading power in and of the international system? These
questions will be at the core of our political debates in the years to come.
US strategists need to think of power, to whatever purpose it is put,
in relative rather than in absolute terms. The key to their success is the
ability to gain the most from their capabilities while their adversaries
do not. US strategists also must understand the difference between the
power to win battles and the power to win wars. Winning battles is important, but the battles have to count toward winning wars. Understanding
which ones do and which ones do not is a purely intellectual exercise.
A renewed American grand strategy would acknowledge the nation’s
tragic flaw: its pride in its force and technology. It would also acknowledge the proximity of this flaw to the nation’s virtue: the set of principles
and institutions for restraining force that have proven uniquely adept
at producing abundant prosperity, force, and with them unsurpassed
power. And it would, finally, exorcise, or at least contain, the ghost that
has haunted American intervention by casting war as a matter of mere
force rather than an instrument of policy.
As they prepare for this spiritual struggle, American grand strategists
might recall that not all ghosts are “goblins damn’d,” as Hamlet worried
the ghost of his father might be; they are just as frequently “spirits of
health,” returning to remind the living of first principles and restore
their sense of duty. We should exorcise our goblins while welcoming the
spiritual remnants of times when American power prevailed even in the
absence of preponderant force.
22     Claudette Roulo, “Chairman Outlines Sequestration’s Dangers,” American Forces Press Service,
February 13, 2013.
23    John Lewis Gaddis, “What is Grand Strategy?” lecture delivered at Duke University, February
26, 2009, http://tiss.sanford.duke.edu/DebatingGrandStrategyDetails.php.
24     Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home,
America” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/13): 7–51.
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The great challenges and opportunities that lie before the statesmen
of the United States lie in questions of American Power. Power is about
choices—choices over how to generate force, in different quantities
and of different qualities; whether we choose to generate force on our
own or in genuine partnership with others. Again, a reflection on the
Monroe Doctrine and the American approach to power versus force is
instructive to us now and going forward. The Doctrine was issued at a
time when nearly all Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal had
achieved independence from the Spanish Empire and the Portuguese
Empire. The United States, working in agreement with Britain, wanted
to guarantee that no European power would move in. It was actually
mainly through partnership with Great Britain that the United States
was able to make credible, with the presence of British military force, the
deterrent threat of Monroe. In short, what we see at the time of Monroe,
and in the Doctrine itself, is a grand expression of American power
(according to most scholars on the subject, one of the grandest expressions of US power in the country's history) at a time when American
force was relatively anemic. This power-force paradox offers the United
States great and important lessons for the gathering and learning as
America's capacities to generate and sustain force inevitably continue
and decline while its global leader responsibilities increase and become
more complex. As Sir Isaac Newton taught us centuries ago, the bigger
determinant over the strength and direction of power is found in how
we displace force over time. Displacement of force, or rather, how we as
a nation choose to use our force, and the manner of behavior behind our
uses of that force, or rather, how we as a nation choose to use our force,
and the manner of behavior behind our uses of that force, independently
and in collective actions with others, is a strong determinant of power,
just and rightful power, legitimate power.
Austerity in terms of dwindling dollars and cents does nothing to
deny citizens nor elected leaders in making these power choices. Only
a self-imposed austerity of sense and sensibility can deny a great nation
like the United States of all the opportunity that “rides on the dangerous
winds” of future times ahead and are, undeniably, ambiguous and ripe
with crisis.
As in past times, why and how America intervenes will matter.

